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BOYCO'ITS AND RESTRICTIVE MARKETING
ARRANGEMENTS
Richard M. Buxbaum*

I

is currently a common if still relatively unheralded practice
for a "fired" dealer to bring an antitrust action against his
former manufacturer-supplier (and perhaps other dealers), alleging that his termination was the result of a boycott.1 Boycottscollective efforts to obtain the exclusion of a party from a marketare illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 Thus, questions concerning the justification for the boycott or the significance
of the offender's market position do not arise. 3
A related but even more obscure development in these situations is the growing use of the allegation that the acts complained
of constituted an attempt to monopolize a usually unspecified
market. 4 While attempts to monopolize are less clearly per se
offenses, and while the proper definition of the relevant market
in such cases is still a matter of debate, 5 it is likely that only the
difficulty of proving a specific intent to monopolize stands in the
way of success in most of these cases.6 If boycott law or flexible "attempt to monopolize" rules can be applied to the acts of businessmen who dismiss distributors for failing to comply with restrictive
marketing arrangements, much of the current debate over substantive standards may be moot. It seems necessary, therefore, to
explore both the concept and scope of the prohibition against boycotts, and its proper place in the marketing field. It should then
T

• Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.-Ed.
I should like to thank Professor Thomas E. Kauper of The University of Michigan
Law School for his painstaking critique of the manuscript, without, however, imputing
to him any responsibility for its shortcomings.
1. Even commentators who are critical of the developing substantive law frequently accept this approach without question. See, e.g., Potvin, Choosing and Dropping Distributors, 26 A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRusr LAW PROCEEDINGS 99 (1964).
2. Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
3. See Ol'l'ENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRusr LAws 661 (2d ed. 1959).
4. See, e.g., Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964); Bragen v.
Hudson County News Co., 321 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1963); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959); A-1 Business Machs. Co. v. Undenvood Corp.,
216 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208
F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962).
5. Compare United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395-96, 423
n.23 (1956), with United States v. Chas. Pfizer &: Co., 245 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
See also Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281, 294
(1956).
6. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir.
1945).
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become evident that the boycott concept is itself too vague, and
has been too loosely· applied, to be useful in judging marketing
practices. At the same time, it will be shown that the boycott pro•
hibition is not necessary for condemning those practices found
illegal under applicable substantive standards. A similar if less
elaborate review of the law on attempts to monopolize should likewise show that problems inherent in the use of the allegation of
attempted monopolization in such marketing complaints militate
against its acceptance, and that this allegation is also not necessary
to condemn practices which are illegal under the developing substantive standards.
Although the for~going comments do not directly concern the
substantive standards of the legitimacy of the various restrictive
marketing arrangements whose termination occasions litigation,7
those standards are at present a matter of such dispute that a brief
sketch of the field is in order. The distribution of goods through
independent channels has always troubled antitrust policy makers,
since the effect of such exclusive arrangements upon competition
is ambivalent. On the one hand, competition in the distribution
of the particular goods being marketed is restrained, or manufacturers of competing goods are foreclosed from certain distribution channels. On the other hand, the same practices may strengthen
competition between the goods being distributed through indepen•
dent channels and the goods of other producers.
The United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that
it is groping for standards to apply to these distribution arrange•
ments; 8 however, its tentative list of criteria is still extremely
vague. 9 The developing standards may vary with the particular
practice. There are indications that a territorial restriction differs
in legality from a promise not to handle competing goods, 10 and
7. See, e.g., Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust LawsA Reappraisal, 40 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1962); Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales AreaJ
Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 111 (1962); Robinson, Restraints on
Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1960); Stone, Closed
Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the Sherman Act, 30 U. Cm. L. REv.
286 (1963).
8. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Cases now pending

offer an opportunity for further clarification. See United States v. Arnold Schwinn &:
Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill.), prob. juris. noted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3197 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1965); United States v. General Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal. 1964),
prob. juris. noted, 380 U.S. 940 (1965). However, the General Motors case is cssen•
tially a resale or collective price-fixing situation.
9. See Stewart, Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors, 22
A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRusr I.Aw PROCEEDINGS 33 (1963); Panel Discussion on Vertical
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, id. at 120, 126-27, 129-31 (1963).
IO. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and Snap-On
Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963), with Standard Oil Co, of Cal, v.
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that exclusive requirements contracts are to be treated differently
from tie-in arrangements.11 More important, the legal standards
may vary from well-established economic standards. An economist
studying industrial organization judges the tie-in, the promise not to
handle competing goods, and the exclusive requirements contract all
by their direct preclusive effect upon competitors of the manufacturer in their efforts to sell goods.12 The exclusive dealership, the
territorial limitation, the customer restriction, and the vertical pricefixing agreement, on the other hand, interest the economist
because of their direct effect upon the competitive purchasing
opportunities of customers for a particular manufacturer's product.18 Although one formal legal distinction corresponds to this
economic one-the latter practices essentially fall under section I of
the Sherman Act, while the former fall under both section I of the
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act-the substantive legal
standards currently developing do not seem to fall into line on the
basis of that distinction. If any characterization of the developing
legal standards is possible, it may be this: Some authorities would
adopt objective "share of the market" data as dispositive throughout,14 while others would use a test which balances various justifications against the indispensability of the practice for achieving the
justified end.15 In each camp, however, the other's primary tests seem
to be employed as important secondary tests. The foregoing classification does not hint at "hard" or "soft" lines when one gets down
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), and Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d
534 (D.C. Cir. 1962). .
C

11. Compare Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), with
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), and United States v. Loew's
Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). But cf. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
12. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19,
25•27 (1957): Burstein, A Theory of Full Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960);
Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 552 (1965); Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in

Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act,
65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 942-48 (1952).
13. See Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 506 (1965). This is an illustration of
the "structure-behavior" interaction which is common in current economic descriptions. See BAIN, INDUSI'RIAL ORGANIZATION (1958).
In the long run, of course, these effects merge. The impact of the first group of
practices upon the structure of the supplier market in time will have consequences
for the choices open to customers. But economists find it useful to separate these
short-range and long-range effects for analysis, and on the whole the decisions seem
to -be following this approach. But see United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38,
44-45 (1962).
.
14. See Rahl, Antitrust Policy in Distribution, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 185, 199 (1955).
15. See, e.g., Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1960); Smith, Vertical Arrangements in Antitrust Law: Exclusive
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to cases. The second group contains ·writers to whom the necessity
of a given practice to achieve the justified goal is often self-evident,10
as well as writers who are ingenious at suggesting equally efficient
but less restrictive provisions and who therefore condemn the given
practice.17
It seems clear that the substantive debate is important enough
to justify the following effort to clarify the concepts being used in
that debate. In any event, I would assert that some debate over
substantive standards is still possible, and that "per se" rules have
not taken over the entire field of restrictive vertical distribution
arrangements. Whether one speaks of "per se" versus "rule of reason" standards in substantive terms, or, more appropriately, sees
the rule of reason as a method of inquiry into the degree of specific
proof or defense appropriate to a given practice,18 some defensive
possibilities exist even for such flagrant pract~~es as tie-ins and
promises not to handle competing goods. 19 At the other extreme,
formidable proof requirements quite obviously still exist with regard to territorial limitations and exclusive requirements contracts.20

I. BoYcorrs
Several types of practices are encompassed by the term "boycott," and therefore some system of classification is required before
a proper analysis of such practices can be undertaken. These practices fall into two main groups: collective boycotts and "boycotts"
by single entities enjoying a dominant or monopolistic market
position.
'

A. Collective Boycotts
Generally speaking, an economic boycott requires the cooperation of a party at a different level in the distribution process from
Dealing Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 18 (1963).
In this general field, Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive
Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 267, 290-319, remains the
most ambitious effort to evaluate various justifications and develop from them standards for decision.
16. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 15; Stewart, Franchise or Protected Territory
Distribution, 8 ANTITRUST BuLL. 447 (1963).
17. See, e.g., Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 795 (1962).
18. See Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964).
19. In lieu of detailed citations, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
329-31 (1962).
20. See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text. See also KAYSEN &: TURNER, ANTI•
TRUST POLICY 157-80 (1959).
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that on which the instigators operate.21 Even though members of
an industry wish to punish or eliminate a certain competitor, they
can do so only by inducing the competitor's customers or suppliers
to stop dealing with him. This they may do, however, by threatening in tum to stop dealing with the competitor's customers or suppliers. If such coercive action is adopted, it may be difficult to
isolate the offensive practice. The cases are surprisingly vague. If
the original threat by the initiators is the illegal act, then the stress
is upon the means, and the legitimacy of the end is irrelevant. The
cases seem to make this the crucial point. The combination-the
collective agreement needed to bring the transaction within section
1 of the Sherman Act-is the arrangement between the manufacturers who agree to boycott retailers who will not act in the desired
fashion vis-a-vis the competing manufacturer.22 Thus the retailers,
as well as the competing manufacturer, are the victims. The example may be turned around if it is a group of retailers who wish
to punish one of their number; indeed, the latter is the more common case.
As evidenced by the facts in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores,23 such a combination may be operative at the responding level as well as at the inducing level. It was alleged that
defendant Broadway-Hale objected to price-cutting on several
appliance lines by its retail competitor, Klor's, and therefore induced a variety of suppliers (who were also defendants) to cease
dealing with Klor's. It is clear that the original interests sought to
be protected were those of Broadway~Hale; at least it was Broadway-Hale which allegedly complained of Klor's price-cutting and
used the leverage of its purchasing power to persuade its suppliers
to boycott Klor's.24 If Broadway-Hale had gone to only one supplier
21. This discussion does not deal with fully voluntary boycotts, in which all
members on a given level in the competitive process participate in order to achieve
common goals. Arrangements of this nature may require an agreement to refuse to
deal with certain parties at a different level in the distribution process. See, e.g.,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &: Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), where Seagram
and Calvert were found to have agreed not to sell liquor to Indiana wholesalers who
would not resell below a price ceiling.
22. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
The combination may be a mixed one including vertically related parties as well. See,
e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &: Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659 (1961).
Again, the emphasis is upon the joint action of the inducing parties, and as the following textual discussion will demonstrate, this is the proper approach. For a discussion of the various possible combinations, see Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusal To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv.
655, 685-86 (1962).
23. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
24. Id. at 209.
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and persuaded it to discontinue sales to K.lor's, the "boycott" might
not have been established, even though the effect would have been
identical.25 On the other hand, if Broadway-Hale and other retailers had concertedly coerced the same supplier, there would
have been a collective boycott at the initiating 0level.26
There is often distinguished a type of "boycott," or collective
refusal to deal, which is thought to be a price-fixing agreement in
disguise. Vertical price-fixing contracts, whereby even a single retailer
agrees to resell goods purchased from a supplier at the prices set by
the latter, are illegal per se under the rule laid down in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park &- Sons.27 This doctrine, which is an
exception to current rules governing analogous vertical arrangements (such as territorial divisions and end-customer restrictions),
was bound to conflict with notions of the individual trader's right
of unilateral refusal to deal. Yet if we ignore non-economic
motives for such refusals,28 it should be apparent that almost all
refusals to deal are a means of achieving or maintaining some vertical
control such as price maintenance, customer restrictions, or manufacturer or dealer exclusives.
In the vertical price-maintenance area, boycott notions have
been combined with the Dr. Miles per se rule and with newer concepts of "implied conspiracy," so as to negate any realistic possibility that a manufacturer could refuse to deal with a price-cutting
distributor.29 This result is exemplified by United States v. Parke,
Davis &- Co.,30 which involved a fairly typical effort to police retail
25. Cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C, Cir,),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). A rare dictum to the contrary, applying boycott
principles to a two-party vertical arrangement, is found in United States v. New York
Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir, 1949), See Note, 51 CALIF. L, REv.
608, 618-19 (1963).
26. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
27. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For the basis of this rule, at least in part, in the dislike of
restraints on alienation, see Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on
Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 258, 270·78.
28. I find it puzzling that commentators tend to overemphasize this freedom to
refuse to deal for non-economic motives. See, e.g., Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts
Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA, L. REv. 1165, 1171
(1959). The two types of motive are adequately distinguishable, and difficulties with
nonrestrictive motives, or even with "ethical" motives that have a peripheral restric•
tive tendency, need not be imported into the field here under discussion. That is an
instance where super-fine analysis _only confuses the issues.
29. This conclusion is challenged by Fulda, Individual Refusals To Deal: When
Does Single Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB, 590
(1965), but-subject to the discussion in note 54 infra-I do not believe he has refuted
the existence of this trend. Compare Kessler &: Stem, Competition, Contract, and
Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 41-42 (1959).
30. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).

February 1966]

Boycotts and Restrictive Arrangements

677

prices by cutting off supplies to mavericks. Certainly the few "spe•
cial" facts mentioned by the court-inducing wholesalers to stop
dealing with offending retailers, and obtaining explicit agreement
of the retailers to stop price advertising-would not be unusual
components in most market situations.
Although even this decision does not clearly characterize the refusal to deal, the "boycott" conspiracy involved was that between the
"web" of distributors who entered into a horizontal agreement to
achieve price uniformity at their level. It is possible to see the twoparty vertical agreement between Parke, Davis and a dealer as the
operative conspiracy or agreement if the arrangement is successful.81
The finding of a conspiracy is hardly possible, however, if the plan
fails because one of the two parties involved declines to conspire.82
If, on the other hand, the operative conspiracy is that of the retailers..
to secure price discipline, then violation of the law is practically auto• ·
matic. The concerted action results either in compliance by or
punishment of the offending retailer, and in both cases there is no
denying the existence of the conspiracy. In effect, the operative
"refusal to deal" in most of the price-fixing cases is not collective,
but rather is a responding sanction imposed by the supplier.38 There
was in Parke, Davis, as in Klor's, an implicit inducing refusal to deal
by the retailers, but it was more hidden and did not figure in the
court's analysis except to suggest the necessary multiplicity of conspirators. This case development away from the single-party vertical
agreement to the collective horizontal or mixed conspiracy eases the
search for a unified approach to judging all such restrictions, as does
the relaxing of requirements for finding a "conspiracy," which was
influenced by the per se illegality of resale price agreements.
·
31. "Parke Davis created a combination with the retailers and the wholesalers to
maintain retail prices ••••" Id. at 45. "The product then comes packaged in a competition-free wrapping ••• by virtue of concerted action induced by the manufacturer.
The manufacturer is thus the organizer of a price-maintenance combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 47. See also note 22 supra.
This seems to be the result in the closely analogous case of Simpson v. Union
Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). In Simpson "there was an agreement for resale price
maintenance, coercively employed." Id. at 24. (Emphasis added.) The last two words
quoted-"coercively employed"-are properly the subject of speculation. See Handler,
Recent Antitrust Developments-1961, 63 MICH, L. REv. 59, 62-65 (1964).
32, Possibly one could characterize the compliant distributor and the manufacturer
as conspirators in their effort to bring a rebelling distributor back into the fold. Their
lack of success could then be shrugged aside under the decision in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
33. Even if the supplier is often cast in the role of the activist, as in Parke, Davis,
this only obscures the fact that his decision to maintain a certain retail pricing image
is a response to the vagaries of the retail market structure as he finds it, and an attempt
to maximize his profit within that framework. Compare text accompanying notes
49.53 infra.
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In summary, "collective refusals to deal," which have been prohibited since the Supreme Court decision in Fashion Originators'
Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,3 4 constitute not one but several practices. The initiator may be an individual or a group. In cases where
the initiator is acting alone, the responding patties-those wielding
the direct club against the maverick-must be multiple.

B. Boycotts by Monopolists
Boycotts by monopolists also encompass differing practices. The
standard example of such conduct may be found in Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 85 where a monopolist wishing to eliminate a
minor competitor threatened to discontinue sales to buyers of advertising space unless they agreed to stop dealing with the competitor. Again, an inducing and a responding refusal to deal were
involved, and again, the former arrangement was the important one.
The case might have been disposed of by finding a collective conspiratorial response by the advertisers in the Klor' s sense or, more
accurately, in the sense of an implied conspiracy like that found in
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States. 86 Such a disposition was
deemed unnecessary, since the initiating party had a dominant
market position. Apparently the boycott-initiating act amply satisfied the conduct requirement of the "monopolize" or "attempt to
monopolize" language of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
As a general rule, however, the prohibition of a refusal to deal
as part of an attempt to monopolize goes far beyond the field of
two-lev~l boycotts. One of the older cases, which is often cited to
overcome the absence of a collective act at either level of the boycott situation, is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials
34. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
35. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
36. 306 U.S. 208 (1939). See also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265
(1942). The "invitation to a common end," which is condemned in these cases, re•
quires the coordinated or simultaneous movement of the invitees into the transaction
upon request of the instigator, and thus, strictly speaking, may be too restricted a
doctrine to explain Klor's. However, the Court's concern with the coordinated aban•
donment of price advertising in Parke, Davis is explainable in these terms. For efforts
to expand the limits of this doctrine, or perhaps to merge all of these notions into a
general doctrine of conspiracy, compare Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., 325
F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963), with Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787
(3d Cir. 1963). In any event, it does not appear that the courts are very much con•
cerned with labeling the exact sub-species of the conspiracy doctrine with which they
justify a decision, and probably would not stick at the "simultaneous movement"
requirement if it ever were an issue in litigation. For an attempt to reconcile these
cases, see Fulda, supra note 29, at 597.
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Co. 87 In that case the "boycotter" was seeking vertical integration forward into the distribution field, and when· its effort to buy out a
local distributor of its product failed, it refused to continue supplying the distributor. This conduct was successfully challenged as an
illegal refusal to deal, since it was undertaken in furtherance of
Eastman Kodak's monopolization of the relevant market. In this
context, of course, Southern Photo's complaint was an effort to
prevent vertical integration and to freeze an existing distribution
framework for a particular product line. Nevertheless, the integration effort was not judged on the same basis as a merger, but
rather on almost a "per se" footing. 38
The antitrust law's feeble grapplings with dual distribution
problems are reflected in Eastman Kodak. It is reminiscent of
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 89 at least as the latter
is described in Mr. Justice Harlan's diss~nt. Furthermore, the revulsion of the courts against a manufacturer who "steals a march" on
independent distributors because of his integrated, "cheaper" structure is obvious here. This attitude is evidenced in some dubious
vertical integration cases,40 and it is also apparent in attacks on resale
price maintenance41 and price discrimination42 by dual-functioning
37. 273 U.S. 359 (1927). See also United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63
F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
38. Strictly speaking, where there is an adequate relevant market, Eastman Kodak's
method of vertical integration should be a per se violation, but the whole point is that
the Court apparently will accept any definition of that market. The foregoing statement may be disputable if applied directly to Eastman Kodak itself, but it very clearly
characterizes the use of Eastman Kodak in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
368 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1962). This result is in contrast to the more rigorous approach
to completed monopolies under § 2 of the Clayton Act. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Indeed, the Poller decision is similar to
the looser approach toward attempts to monopolize, id. at 395 n.23 and toward
mergers -under § 7 of the Clayton Act, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 325 (1962).
39. 368 U.S. 464 (1962). For present purposes, it is interesting to note the factual
context of the Poller decision. The Columbia Broadcasting System purchased a local
station, and thereafter refused to deal further with another competing local station.
CBS transferred the network programming from the latter station to its new subsidiary.
40. See, e.g., United States v. New York Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949); Reynolds Metals Co. v. ITC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also
Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 27, 53-57 (1949); Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1289, 1312-17
(1948).
41. United States v. McKesson &: Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
42. See Borden Co. v. ITC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L.
WEEK 3117 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1965). See also Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir.
1956). Unfortunately, the best discussion of all aspects of dual distribution channels
is not available in English. See JACOB-STEINORTH, DER ZWEIGLEISIGE VERTRIEB VON
MARKENWAREN IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN REcHT (1964). A shorter, more xlarrowly based study is Jordan, The Robinson-Patman Act Aspects of Dual Distribution
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manufacturers. The mixture of unfair competition doctrines with
antitrust laws has produced an odd blend, but that is a separate story.
The practice which has been described herein as a "monopolistic
refusal to deal" is only tangentially to be classified as a per se boycott
offense.48

I!.

BOYCOTTS AS A PROHIBITED MEANS OF ENFORCING RESTRICTIVE
DISTRIBUTION .ARRANGEMENTS

This review of the practices which are commonly lumped together under the "boycott" label suggests that the term itself is too
loosely and variously used to be appropriate for accurate character.ization of the legal status of such activity. In addition, and as the
following discussion will demonstrate in greater detail, the per se
illegality of most of these boycott situations cannot be appropriately
attached to such practices. Indeed, if such labels were appropriate,
all restrictive distribution contracts would eventually be illegal,
for the refusal to deal as a sanction to obtain or repress certain behavior is a self-evident companion of all restrictive marketing arrangements, or, in other words, of all manufacturers' arrangements
in imperfectly competitive markets.44
The basic question is this: If a given restrictive distribution
arrangement is legitimate in its factual context, can its enforcement
be considered illegal once it is characterized as a boycott? A growing number of cases seem to indicate that this question should be
answered affirmatively. For example, in McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply45 former franchise holders of Western Auto complained of the termination of their franchise, alleging that it
occurred because of their refusal to stop selling competing products. A remand to allow amended pleadings that properly alleged
a "conspiracy" was granted, the court recognizing the legitimacy of
"unilateral refusals to deal" but condemning a restrictive course of
by Brand of Consumer Goods, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 394 (1965). It is hoped that the Su•
preme Court's opinion in Borden will stimulate further discussion of these problems,
which touch on unfair competition as well as price discrimination.

43. Perhaps these "monopolization" cases are best classified by comparing them to
"collective boycott" de_cisions, which really involve the exercise of market power by
members of an association with membership barriers. See note 21 supra. If so, the
analogy between Eastman Kodak and Poller and such cases as Associated Press v. Taft•
Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965), and United
States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960), should be
explored. See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Turner,
supra note 22, at 666-67.
44. See Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121 (1949).
45. 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
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dealing between seller and buyer46 that might ripen into an implied
understanding. The court went" on to say that a treble damage
action could be based only upon an autonomous violation of the
antitrust laws-here section 3 of the Clayton Act. 47 In testing the
pleadings under that section, however, the court merely repeated that
the asserted distinction between unilateral and consensual refusals
to deal was dispositive of the legality of the practice.48 Neither the
relevancy of the line of commerce nor the substantiality of the effect
upon competition was even broached.
This approach may achieve undue respectability as a result of
certain language in Mr. Justice Brennan's co~curring opinion in
White Motor Co. v. United States.49 Seeking guidelines with which
to judge territorially protected exclusive-distribution arrangements,
he looked first to the circumstances of their genesis. He felt that if
these exclusive arrangements were "essentially" the work of a
horizontal agreement among dealers rather than an expression of
the manufacturer's interests, then they would be illegal.50 This is
usually not a useful line of inquiry. As an influential student comment51 had already pointed out, the manufacturer's own interest
in effective distribution often dictates his yielding to dealers' insistence on exclusivity.52 Territorial security will be a major demand of any potential distributor-even one acting autonomously
-so the prevalence of territorial-security clauses proves nothing.
There may be an occasional situation where a joint demand for
territorial security by a group of potential distributors achieves for
each a position that no individual would have had sufficient leverage to obtain. This rare case can be condemned. The. pressure for
such provisions, however, is undoubtedly a factor in most negotiations, and a supplier's stand in the face of that pressure depends upon
t:he bargaining distributor's leverage-the distribution potential he
seems to offer the supplier in comparison with other alternatives.58
46. Italics are supplied to call into question the court's preoccupation wit!). the
two-party, vertical course of dealing.
47. See 269 F.2d at 337.
48. Id. at 337-38.
49.
50.
51.
52.

372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963).
Id. at 267.
Note, 75 HARv. L. REY. 795 (1962).
"But an approach that attempts to determine which party's interest or initiative
is more fully served by the agreement encounters difficulties; for the most significant
interests of the manufacturers are themselves framed in terms of the interests of the
dealer." Id. at 825. (This note was cited several times in Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion.) But see Turner, supra note 22, at 698-99.
53. This includes other potential distributors with whom a better bargain might
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Such considerations are only subsidiary to the issue that should
be the central concern of the law in this field: the degree to which
territorial-protection clauses narrow customer choices of alternative offerings of that supplier's product. To concentrate on "conspiracy" would be useless in most situations and, if uncritically
extended to what I posit as the "normal" case, would be unduly
harsh. Indeed, if a multitude of dealers make the same demand,
even if the later ones to do so are influenced by the earlier demands of the others, a conspiracy (actual or implied) is still not
made out. At the least, Turner's ·objection, put forth in a different
structural context, to condemning ambiguous conduct which can be
characterized as either autonomous or collective behavior is equally
applicable in this situation. 54
Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motor gives
too much weight to these conspiracy concepts and to other nonquantifiable aspects of distribution arrangements. The relative
need for the territorial-protection provision to achieve the asserted
end is made too important a factor in the evaluation of the legality
of the provision.55 It is true that Mr. Justice Brennan does not
entirely ignore the dealer's local market position and the manufacturer's more general "share of the market" 66 and both approaches
are thus available for further development. At present, however,
the notion of collective conspiracy in the creation of restrictive
be struck as well as vertically integrated distribution efforts, which might be more
favorable despite the initial investment required.
54. See Turner, supra note 22, at 666, 671, 683. Fulda, supra note 29, secs the
problem entirely as one of conspiratorial refusals to deal, and seeks to show-by use
of essentially the same group of cases -used herein-that the courts (at least some•
times) are reluctant to draw the full consequences from their acceptance of conspiracy
allegations, and thus often find for defendants on the merits. Such reluctance is to
be expected, but to leave the matter there is to accept a jungle of ill-articulated cases
(see id. at 605 n.82), tortuous distinctions (see id. at 595-97), and impossible dogma
(see the discussion of "mere switching of distributors," id. at 597 n.46). Further, it
forces use of the "no completed contract" error in Clayton Act § 3 cases (see text
accompanying notes 78-85 infra) in order to hold tie-in and exclusive dealing provisions to the same standards as those applied to Sherman Act § 1 restrictions-a result
running counter to the scheme of the section. For an attempt to use a generous con•
spiracy doctrine to overcome the latter objection, coupled with an uncritical acceptance
of the conspiracy theory in the entire restrictive distribution field, see Comment,
64 YALE L.J. 581 (1953). It still seems preferable to attempt a conceptual synthesis
of the field.
55. See 372 U.S. at 269-70. For even less appealing discussions, sec Snap-On Tools
Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
&: Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill.), prob. juris. noted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3197 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1965).
56. See 372 U.S. at 268. Compare Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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distribution arrangements has borne unwelcome fruit in litigation
concerning the termination of such arrangements.
Many of the cases which discuss termination of distribution
contracts display an uncritical acceptance of the idea that collusion
is the key to a finding of illegality.57 This is not surprising, since
even some older decisions rejected attacks upon terminations of
distributorships on the ground that producers are always free to
refuse to deal, rather than in terms of a market analysis. 58 With the
shrinking of the refusal-to-deal immunity under the joint effect of
Parke, Davis and the implied conspiracy concept, such cases are no
longer authoritative, but their method of approach remains to
confuse the issue in other termination cases. Thus, even legitimate
revisions of distribution patterns may be challenged when such
action results in the dismissal of one dealer in order to substitute
another or an integrated marketing system.59
The aforementioned approach is even less sound in termination
situations than in abstract reviews of territorial clauses. A dealer's
distributorship may be cancelled because he failed to abide by a
restrictive distribution agreement,60 and in another case his contract
may not be renewed in order to make way for another, better
dealer 61 or to develop a system of vertical integration. 62 The change
57. See, e.g., Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963); Gorham &: Johnson,
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. 308 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963);
Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 295 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1961); Precision Dynamics
Corp. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 241 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Julius M.
Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Donlan v. Carvel, 209 F. Supp. 829 (D. Md. 1962); Alpha Distrib. Co. of Cal., Inc.
v. Jack Daniels Distillery, Lem Motlow Prop., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Cal. 1961),
affd, 304 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1962). For other cases dealing with similar allegations of
collusion, see Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 242 F. Supp. 852 (D. Mass. 1965);
A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Gray Line New York Tours Corp., 242 F. Supp. 365
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); C.B.S. Business Equip. Corp. v. Underwood Corp., 240 F. Supp. 413
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Hutchinson v. American Oil Co., 221 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
But see Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 922 (1963).
58. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Co., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). But see the market analysis explanation of these cases in
Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 269 n.8 (1963).
59. See Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963).
60. See, e.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.
1959).
61. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 58 and 59 supra.
62. See, e.g., Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Hutchinson v. American Oil Co., 221 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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may have been suggested or instigated by a fellow dealer, 68 or even
by several complaints from fellow dealers. 64 If, however, the particular restrictive marketing pattern is considered legitimate under
applicable standards, these considerations should all be irrelevant.
Other dealers may very well object to a fellow dealer's poaching in
violation of a territorial provision, but that has nothing to do with
the legality of the system.
Only in one special situation would a collective complaint of
this nature be relevant. There are cases in which the restrictive provision is introduced into an existing distribution network for the
first time after a dealer acts against the expectations of fellow
dealers, as, for example, by poaching on their territories. 6G Discussions between the complaining dealers before they call in their
supplier may be a more common occurrence in such cases than
when a distribution network is first being created. This is clearly
a case of initiation of restrictive clauses and, if such discussions
occur, can be condemned on the strictest theory of conspiracy, but
should not justify similar condemnations where an existing and
presumably legal restrictive provision is being disobeyed.
The appeal of conspiracy theories throughout these areas is
understandable but meretricious. Admittedly, most of the pressure
on suppliers to initiate or enforce price maintenance or territorial
exclusivity comes from the "fair" dealers. Moreover, these practices,
which particularly concern distributors, rather than competing manufacturers, raise problems that technically deal with section 1 of the
Sherman Act rather than section 3 of the Clayton Act. But that
should be irrelevant; the applicable standards should emphasize
the result of each practice in its economic context rather than the
circumstances of its evolution.
The policing of vertical price maintenance seems to be judged
purely by the application of boycott principles. 66 This approach is
63. See, e.g., Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert,
denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
64. See Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1963). The court considered the factor of multiple complainants to be vital to the case.
Id. at 7-8. Compare Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring ·opinion in White Motor. In
fairness to the foregoing opinions, it should be noted that they purport to reject
conspiracy counts in instances where a single new distributor persuades the supplier
to switch to him and away from a previous distributor. But then there typically
follows a search for "multiple" conspiring parties. For a picture of the resulting confusion, see Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co. of Kan., Inc., 5 CCH TRADE
REG. REP. 1J 71605 (10th Cir. 1965).
65. See, e.g., Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963),
Compare Kessler &: Stern, supra note 29, at 82 n.375.
66. See United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 862 U.S. 29 (1960).
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acceptable, since agreements to maintain resale prices are illegal
per se.67 Thus the only problem is to find an "agreement." Indeed,
because of the strictness of the foregoing rule, any provision for the
maintenance of resale prices is bound to fare harshly in the courts,
and the slightest evidence of a collective arrangement will suffice
to condemn the practice. 68 But so long as an entire network of
vertical agreements to divide teqitories or customers69 is valid, even
though engendered by pressures from the retail level, the manufacturer's insistence that these agreements be honored on pain of
non-renewal of dealerships, or termination 0£ existing relationships
in order to create other arrangements, should be equally valid.

III. "ATIEMPTs To

MoNoPOLIZE" AS.A CHALLENGE

TO MARKETING .ARRANGEMENTS

A growing number of complaints allege that a termination of a
dealer in favor of another dealer, or in favor of vertical integration,
is part of an attempt to monopolize local distribution of the supplier's products in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.7° For
67. See note 27 supra. As an original proposition, this rule can be criticized. Vertical
price fixing and vertical exclusive territory arrangements are equally good or bad. Such
practices inhibit competition at the distribution level, but only in the one product
involved. Manufacturers' business motive& for setting up a network of distributors
who are bound to &ell only at a certain price, and for setting up a network of exclusive
territories, are essentially similar. The different approaches of Dr. Miles and White
Motor are therefore anomalous. One practical justification for the differing results
may be that suppliers carefully weigh the relative cost of indulging in territorial
security, whereas less reflection may accompany price maintenance decisions, since
the cost of the latter practice to the supplier is less apparent; See Tel&er, Why Should
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. LAw &: EcoN. 86 (1960).
68. See note 36 supra. In other words, the only threshold requirement in such
cases is the existence of an agreement; indeed, coercion now substitutes for agree•
ment to some undefined extent. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 u:s. 13
(1964); cf. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 963 (1961). For an explanation of this development, see note 86. infra and accompanying text. Compare Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 624, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3245 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1966).
69. If White Motor represents the substantive law in this area, it may be unrealistic
to assume that end-customer restrictions can be valid. See White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 272-75 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
70. For some interesting recent efforts to apply this doctrine in ordinary distribution situations, &ee Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690 (1962); Best Advertising Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.
1965); Laundry Equip. Sales Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964);
Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476, 480 (E.D. Mo.
1965); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 241 F. Supp. 259
(E.D.S.C. 1965); Hutchinson v. American Oil Co., 221 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1963);
Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Poster
Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 198 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ga. 1961), aff'd,
305 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1962). Compare H. E. Fletcher Co. v, Rock of Ages Corp., 326
F.2d 13 {2d Cir. 1963); A-1 :Business Machs. Co. v. Underwood Corp., 216 F. Supp. 36
(E.D. Pa. 1963).
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reasons similar to those advanced against the use of the boycott
concept, it would seem that marketing arrangement problems need
not and should not-at least not primarily-be resolved through
the use of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The most common point of confusion involves the correct standards for definition of the geographic or product market within which
the attempt is alleged to have taken place. Some authorities point
to standards as high as those applied in straight monopolization
cases, which define the market broadly through conventional economic analysis and thus diminish the relative position, and thereby
the vulnerability to attack, of the supplier.71 Other authorities seem
to have applied less rigorous standards72 by adopting an analogy to
conspiracy cases,73 in which actual power to achieve the desired
result is regarded as unnecessary. If the latter standard were accepted
for attempt cases, its application to marketing situations would
again raise the danger of automatic illegality. Although the additional requirement of a specific intent to monopolize might be an
important and appropriate barrier to such results, nevertheless
specific intent is generally found in the "viciousness" of the acts
constituting the attempt. In marketing cases, the admittedly restrictive and often exclusionary provision being policed or imposed by
the manufacturer too readily qualifies for that label.
Some courts are accepting, perhaps too readily, the validity of
charges brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act on the basis
of an admittedly restrictive provision and an inadequately defined
market.74 This practice, if accepted, in effect would subvert the
examination that should properly be made: application of the appropriate substantive standards to the total restrictive arrangement
pattern in its market context.75 It is not reasonable to accept a
complaint under section 2 of the Sherman Act if the marketing
system in question would not be illegal under some other provision
such as section 3 of the Clayton Act. Since the Clayton Act is in one
71. For recent arguments for this position which distinguish attempts to monopolize
from conspiracies to monopolize, sec United States v. Chas. Pfizer &: Co., 245 F. Supp.
737 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); :Becker v. Safclitc Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625, 637 (D. Kan,
1965). Sec also A-1 :Business Machs. Co. v. Underwood Corp., 216 F. Supp. 36 (E.D,
Pa. 1963); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir, 1959).
72. Sec, e.g., :Bragcn v. Hudson County News Co., 321 F.2d 864 (3d Cir, 1963);
Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz :Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Ind, 1962).
73. Occasionally the allegation in these cases is of a conspiracy to monopolize, Sec,
e.g., Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 295 F.2d 573 (7th Cir, 1961).
74. Sec cases cited in note 72 supra.
75. For a proper analysis under § 2 of the Sherman Act of the marketing context,
sec Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964).
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sense designed to head off incipient but not yet full-blown violations of the Sherman Act,76 such a practice is indefensible in light
of the interrelationship of the two statutes. Finally, certain restrictive vertical marketing provisions, such as territorial exclusivity,
do not fall under section 3 of the Clayton Act, and therefore must
be judged under the Sherman Act. 77 If these marketing arrangements
are being attacked under section 2 of the Sherman Act in order to
avoid the conspiracy requirements of section l, a proper application
of these section 1 requirements, as discussed below, would remove
the pressure for such allegations. Here too, as in the l?oycott situations, an objection to the developing practice should be registered.

IV. THE

CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF "AGREEMENT" IN
VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION SITUATIONS

The foregoing discussion has emphasized the need to differentiate the problem of when a practice is illegal from the problem of
proving the existence of the practice. It will now be helpful to
discuss the latter problem in isolation, and to deal separately with
restrictions falling under section I of the Sherman Act and under
section 3 of the Clayton Act. It may then be possible to relate the
"agreement" requirements of these two statutes and to suggest a
single, easily applied concept of "agreement" suitable for all restrictive marketing provisions falling under either statute.
The Clayton Act requirement is in one sense the easier to
satisfy. All that is needed is a finding that a "condition" has been
unilaterally imposed by the supplier. It is not necessary to show
assent on the part of the distributor.78 Although theoretically a
supplier is still free to maintain resale price levels by announcing
the terms on which he will deal with distributors, such action 1s
nevertheless not legal in the tie-in or exclusive dealing fields.
76. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962); Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1922).
77. See note 88 infra and cases cited in note 8 supra.
78. Specifically, § 3 of the Clayton Act provides: "Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or
make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies
or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or
resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia
or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States,
or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on
the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce."
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There exists, however, another, ostensibly judge-made, hurdle
under the Clayton Act. A notion has wormed its way into the field
to the effect that only consummated agreements can violate that statute. 79 According to this rule, mere efforts to obtain agreement, or
termination of the relationship for refusal of the dealer to cooperate,
supposedly do not suffice for a violation of section 3 of the Clayton
Act.Bo In actual practice, however, most courts seem to ignore this
rule.Bi Whatever its reception, this notion seems unsound, since it
confuses substantive standards of legality with questions of remedy.
The illegal characteristic of such an arrangement is the pattern,
which exists whether or not the particular complaining distributor
assented to it or refused to cooperate. If an illegal pattern exists, the
complaining distributor need not show he was part of it in order to
recover for the harm visited upon him by virtue of the manufacturer's _effort to create or maintain it.B2 Efforts to justify recovery
on finespun if reasonable theories of implied conspiracy are not
really needed.BS The illegality of the practice in the total context
is enough to allow the next step to be that of proving damages,84
79. The cases so holding are reviewed and criticized in Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal,
75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 692-94 (1962). Much of what follows in the text is either an
extension of, or a borrowing from, the Turner discussion. Sec id. at 695-703. Certainly
Turner was concerned with this problem and was critical of the "executed transac•
tion" requirement. I think subsequent cases permit different and perhaps clearer
reflection upon the matter. See also Kessler 8: Stem, Competition, Contract, and
Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 83-86 (1959).
80. This doctrine is further explained in Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 847, 860 n.52 (1955), and is criticized as
being surmountable under implied conspiracy doctrines, in Comment, 64 YALE L.J.
581 (1953). See the review of cases and comments in OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAws 716-18 (2d ed. 1959).
81. I do not believe the doctrine is understood or, more to the point, followed by
the courts. One example of this, though distinguishable, is given by Turner, supra
note 79, at 693 n.53. See also Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 574 (4th Cir.
1963); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1963);
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,
221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Albert H. Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos 8:
Rubber Co., 220 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
82. It is now reasonably certain that the disadvantaged distributor has standing
to recover damages for a violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act, even though the statute's
aim tends more to the protection of competitive suppliers. See Bales v. Kansas City Star
Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964). See also Turner, supra note 79, at 693-94 n.54.
83. In other words, proof of the "condition" or "understanding" that the purchaser
must refrain from handling non-competing products, for example, was usually less
difficult than proof of a conspiracy under the Sherman Act. In the former situation,
the success of the manufacturer in keeping dealers in line with his "announced policy"
suffices; in the latter case, some (diminishing) attention is still paid to the means used.
84. See Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 571-72, 572 n.8 (4th Cir. 1963).
In a rare case there may be no proof of a pattern of conduct by the supplier; then,
if indeed the arrangement is challengeable at all, there would have to be a showing
of a specific (probably vertical) contractual arrangement between the complaining
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at least where there is some relationship between the practice and
the plaintiff's losses.85
Admittedly, this analysis either permits different results depending upon whether the restrictive provision is judged under section I of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act, or it
proves too much in that it is somehow also available in cases under
section I of the Sherman Act despite that section's conspiracy requirements. If either criticism is valid, it would be preferable for
the moment to concede the first. The shortcut in Clayton Act situations is based on the fact that the statute leads to, and indeed
requires, a finding of illegality only after the entire practice has
been reviewed.
In fact, however, the same shortcut is making its way into the
cases under section I of the Sherman Act, under the misunderstood
rubric, "pattern of coercion."86 Two recent decisions have indicat~d
that the successful imposition of resale price maintenance as a total
pattern is on its way to becoming an automatic violation of the
statute.87 In other words, the conspiratorial or collective element
in section I of the Sherman Act is being dispensed with.
distributor and the supplier. See South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650,
654 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Albert H. Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos &: Rubber Co.,
220 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). To reemphasize the point: the use of § 1 of the
Sherman Act instead of § 3 of the Clayton Act should be unnecessary in the usual case,
and unhelpful in the rare case.
It .has been suggested that the whole problem under discussion could be resolved
from the point of view of damages, by denying recovery unless the private plaintiff
showed public injury. See Timberlake, The Public Injury Aspect of Private Treble
Damage Actions, 8 .ANTrntusr BuLL. 781, 790 (1963). This assumes that public injury
and the substantive law of vertical restrictions are one and the same thing, an assump•
tion that has not yet been articulated by the courts. In any event, it does not preclude
the flight to "conspiracy" allegations to avoid the public injury (or substantive law)
requirement. See also Kessler &: Stem, supra note 79, at 97-98.
85. The relationship between the illegal practice and the plaintiff's harm may occasionally cause difficulties, but viewing the private remedy as a deterrent usually suggests the amr1ver. For example, a supplier may terminate a distribution agreement
on the ground that a distributor will not abide by, or accede to, an "illegal" restriction.
Damages should be recoverable in such a case. Similarly, the supplier may have been
motivated ·by a desire to enter into a different distribution arrangement which happens to be "illegal," and the illegal aspect might not have been the factor which
resulted in the distributor's termination. Nevertheless, damages may well be recoverable. Finally the supplier may have terminated the distributor in order to end an illegal
situation; the problem of damages in this case is another matter. They may be
recoverable, but not because of the termination.
86. See Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 963 (1961). While purporting to require an express agreement in order to establish a conspiracy, the court made the coerciveness of the TBA tie-in there involved
the practical equivalent of an "agreement." See the earlier but relevant discussion of
"coercion" in Kessler &: Stem, supra note 79, at 105-06 and n.478.
87. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
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This is not as significant or radical a development as may appear
at first glance. Apart from resale price maintenance cases, in which
the conspiracy requirement had already become very attenuated, the
only situations in which this "pattern" or "pattern of coercion"
approach will be interesting are the territorial and customer restriction cases. All others-exclusive dealing and tie-in cases particularly
-are handled under section 3 of the Clayton Act, where this nonconspiratorial pattern approach is appropriate in any event. 88 If
the pattern approach is appropriate in the latter situations, then it is
equally appropriate for territory and customer restriction arrangements, since their legality or illegality as a matter of substantive
law also depends upon the "total picture" review used under section 3 of the' Clayton Act. Indeed, to come full circle, the application of this "pattern of coercion" approach to such resale price
maintenance cases as Parke, Davis is also desirable. There, too, the
real issues are the same,89 and the red herring of collective boycott
or impiied conspiracy can easily be discarded. Where a true conspiracy finding is essential, the "legitimate refusal to deal v. boycott"
antithesis may still be significant. Clayton Act cases, however, need
no such finding, and the limited group of Sherman Act situations
discussed above should likewise need none. "Coercion" is as good
a substitute for "contract, conspiracy or combination" as is "invitation to a common end"-at least in the vertical distribution field.
A successful network provides a substitute for the unambiguous
horizontal conspiracy.90
If the formal objection is made that the "conspiracy" requirement of section I of the Sherman Act must be honored explicitly,
it is fair to reply that the implied conspiracy doctrines that were
decisive in Interstate Circuit and Parke, Davis are flexible enough to
include result-oriented descriptions such as "pattern of coercion." 01
In sum, if a marketing practice viewed in the entire market context
is, abstractly seen, illegal, there should be no need to search for an
agreement upon which to base a complaint. If it is not, boycott
concepts should not be used to bootstrap the practice into illegality.
88. Some situations which seem to fall within § 3 of the Clayton Act must be
brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act for minor reasons of statutory scope, See,
e.g., Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
963 (1961).
89. That is, the interplay between increased inter-brand competition and decreased
intra-brand competition is similar. See Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240
F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hutchinson v. American Oil Co., 221 F. Supp, 728
(E.D. Pa. 1963).
90. See Turner, supra note 79, at 692.
91. See also note 36 supra.

